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Banking Illustrative engagement

A regional bank's external and internal penetration tests, and a remediation plan written to FFIEC guidance

A regional bank with about 25 branches and about 400 staff, a leader in its segment.

Scale
~25 branches, ~400 staff, 1 external and 1 internal test, 1 tracked remediation plan
Engagement
5 weeks of testing and reporting, with remediation tracked over the following 4 months

The challenge

The bank's board and its examiners expected independent evidence that its defenses worked, not only policies. Its last test was two years old, the network had grown through a branch acquisition, and nobody could say what an attacker on the internet, or on a branch network, could actually reach.

A regional bank with about 25 branches needed independent evidence that its defenses held up. Its board and its examiners expected tested proof, not only policies, and its last penetration test was two years old. The client is not named on this page, and this is an illustrative engagement that describes the kind of work our team does; details are composite. No customer records were needed or viewed.

Everything began with written rules of engagement. The document named the addresses and accounts in scope, the hours the testers could work, the people to call if something broke and the conditions that would pause the test. Banks run systems that cannot stop, so the bank's security officer agreed to every step first. Our team keeps that authorization on file for the same reason an auditor will ask to see it.

The external test looked at what an attacker on the internet could reach: online-banking front ends, remote access, mail, VPN gateways and hosts that had been forgotten after a migration. The internal test started where a thief with a stolen laptop or a malicious visitor would start, on a branch network and then with a standard user account. It checked whether a branch could reach the core banking servers, whether passwords and local administrator rights were reused, and which Active Directory weaknesses led to domain administrator.

Findings were ranked by likelihood and impact and written twice: a short summary for the board and a technical section for the engineers, each item with evidence, a fix and a retest step. The remediation plan followed the structure that FFIEC guidance on information security and risk management describes in general terms: risk assessment, controls, testing, reporting to the board and management follow-up. It gave each item an owner, a priority and a due date. Items the bank chose not to fix at once went on a risk register with management's decision recorded.

Retesting confirmed that the fixed items were closed, and the report was dated and filed. The bank now repeats the cycle each year and after major changes, such as a branch acquisition or a new online-banking release. This is a technical assessment, not a legal opinion, and it does not certify compliance with any regulation; the bank's own examiners and counsel decide that.

What our team delivered

  • Signed rules of engagement naming the addresses, accounts, hours, emergency contacts and a stop rule, agreed with the bank's security officer before any packet was sent
  • An external penetration test of internet-facing systems: remote access, online-banking front ends, mail, VPN gateways and forgotten hosts
  • An internal penetration test from a branch network position and from a standard user account, checking segmentation, password and local administrator reuse, Active Directory weaknesses and paths to the core banking servers
  • Findings ranked by likelihood and impact, each with evidence, a fix and a retest step, written for both the board and the engineers
  • A remediation plan with an owner, priority and due date per item, and a risk register for items the bank chose to accept for now, with management's decision recorded
  • A retest of the closed items and a dated report the bank can show its board, its auditors and its examiners

Result

The bank has dated, independent test evidence and a remediation plan it works through item by item, with each decision recorded. The same cycle repeats each year and after major changes. This is a technical assessment, not a legal opinion or a certification.

Get this for your company

Related services with fixed prices and a written scope.

Initial assessment of public endpoints

What an attacker can see and reach from the internet: your domains, mail, websites, remote access and cloud exposure.

Report within 5 business days of kickoff

$1,000 per assessment

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Managed IT and security (MSP)

One monthly price per team member: help desk, device management, patching, backup monitoring and security basics.

Onboarding starts within 10 business days

$100 per team member, per month

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Insurance-ready bundle

The three things cyber insurers and clients ask for most: an external assessment, a phishing simulation for 25 users and a disaster recovery plan.

Assessment report in 5 business days; plan draft in 15 business days

$5,400 per bundle, phishing simulation for 25 users

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Managed security monitoring

Endpoint detection and response watched by our analysts, priced per device.

Agents deployed within 7 business days

$18 per endpoint, per month

Details

After you purchase, we contact you within 1 hour, any time of day or night, to start onboarding.

No payment is taken online. When we call you within the hour we confirm the scope and send an invoice (ACH, card or crypto).

Attack it before attackers do

Our red team probes your systems the way a real attacker would, and every weakness it finds becomes a fix your defenders put in place and we retest.

Attack it before attackers doDiagram of offensive versus defensive security. On the left, the red team runs reconnaissance, an exploit attempt and a lateral movement attempt against your systems in the centre. On the right, the blue team detects the activity through a SIEM and EDR alert, contains the affected host and patches the weakness. The lateral movement attempt is blocked once the host is contained. A loop along the bottom shows findings becoming fixes and then being retested. Offensive (red team)Defensive (blue team)1ReconScan and map2Exploit attemptTest weak points3Lateral movementTry to spread1DetectSIEM · EDR alert2ContainIsolate the host3PatchClose the gapYour systemsTested and hardenedEvery finding becomes a fix, then a retestFindingsFixesBlocked

Separate by region and by business unit

Each business unit lives in its own VRF and VLAN in every region, so a problem in retail cannot reach finance. Traffic between units has to pass a firewall that denies by default and allows only what is written down.

Separate by region and by business unitA grid with three regions, Americas, EMEA and APAC, and three business units, Finance, Retail and R&D. Each cell is a separate VRF with its own VLAN and VNI. Each business unit has one overlay running across its three regional cells, shown as a row. On the right a firewall zone enforces a zero-trust policy that denies by default. A red packet from Retail trying to reach Finance is blocked at the firewall. A teal packet from R&D to the shared DNS and identity services is allowed. AMERICASEMEAAPACFinanceVRF fin · VLAN 110VNI 10110VRF fin · VLAN 110VNI 10110VRF fin · VLAN 110VNI 10110RetailVRF retail · VLAN 120VNI 10120VRF retail · VLAN 120VNI 10120VRF retail · VLAN 120VNI 10120R&DVRF rnd · VLAN 130VNI 10130VRF rnd · VLAN 130VNI 10130VRF rnd · VLAN 130VNI 10130Firewallzoneszero trustdeny bydefaultSharedDNS · IdPdenyallowVRF · L3 isolationVLAN to VNI · L2Default-deny policyEVPN-VXLAN fabricWireGuard + IPsec WANLogs to one SIEM

Critical patches in days, not months

Distribution of days from vendor patch release to deployment for critical-severity CVEs, before and after a managed patching service. The dashed line marks two weeks: under CISA BOD 22-01, US federal agencies must remediate Known Exploited Vulnerabilities within two weeks for CVEs assigned in 2021 or later (six months for older ones). Private organisations are not bound by it, but it is a sensible benchmark. Illustrative figures.

Critical patches in days, not monthsGrouped bars of the distribution of days to patch critical CVEs, percent of patches. Before: 0 to 3 days 4, 4 to 7 days 8, 8 to 14 days 14, 15 to 30 days 26, 31 to 60 days 24, 61 to 90 days 14, over 90 days 10. After managed patching: 22, 40, 28, 7, 2, 1, 0. A dashed line at 14 days marks the CISA KEV remediation window. 26 percent were patched within 14 days before, 90 percent after.Days to patch, critical CVEs (% of patches)Before: ad hoc patchingAfter: managed patching0%10%20%30%40%4%22%0–38%40%4–714%28%8–1426%7%15–3024%2%31–6014%1%61–9010%0%90+days from patch release to deployedCISA KEV window: 14 days26% → 90%patched within 14 daysBOD 22-01: 2 weeks (CVE from 2021), 6 months (older). Each series sums to 100%.

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