Aventura, Florida · serving clients across the United States (305) 404-9404Toll-free (800) 767-8566Emergency? Get a call within 1 hour

Property Management

We find out whether your office, your building systems and the portals your residents and vendors use are safe from attackers, and fix what we find. Property managers move rent and owner money every month, hold tenant identity and screening data, and run door access, cameras and building controls that outside vendors maintain over the internet. We close the payment gaps, separate the systems that should never share a network and give each vendor a controlled way in.

A property manager is a payments business, a records business and a building-operations business at the same time. Rent and owner distributions move on fixed dates, applicant and tenant files hold identity and income data, and the buildings run on door controllers, cameras and building controls that vendors support remotely. Each of those is something an attacker can use.

Our team treats property management as a cybersecurity problem first. We test whether the office network, the building systems, the resident networks, the payment process and the vendor and owner portals are safe from attackers, then fix what we find: payment-change controls that hold up when a message looks real, building systems on their own networks, vendor access that is named, timed and recorded, and tenant files kept in fewer places with clear access. We work around the leasing calendar and leave your team able to run what we build.

What we see in your industry

  • Rent-payment and owner-distribution fraud targets the money that moves on a schedule. A fake message from an owner, a tenant or a vendor asks for a distribution or a payment to go to a new account, or a resident portal login is taken over and the payment details changed. A written callback rule and a hold on changed bank details stop most of it.
  • Tenant and applicant files carry identity documents, Social Security numbers, income records, bank details and screening reports. A property manager is often the only copy-holder, so where that data sits, who can open it and how long it is kept decide the size of a breach.
  • Door access, cameras, elevators and building controls are computers on the building's network, maintained by outside vendors. When they share a network with the leasing office and the residents, a weak vendor password becomes a way into everything else.
  • Resident and guest Wi-Fi is part of the product and part of the risk. Without client isolation and a separate path to the internet, one resident's infected device can see another's, and nothing from the resident side should ever reach the office.
  • Owners, vendors and contractors reach the firm through portals, shared drives and remote-support tools. Accounts that outlive the vendor and one shared password for many technicians leave doors open that nobody is watching.

Rent-payment and owner-distribution fraud comes first. The common pattern is a message that looks like part of a normal thread asking accounting to send the next distribution, or a vendor payment, to a new bank account. A second pattern takes over a resident or owner portal login and changes the payout details. We set one written rule, no bank-detail change from a message alone, and back it with a callback to a number already on file, two people on every change, a hold on the first payment to a changed account and a weekly review of every change to payee records. Authenticated email with SPF, DKIM and DMARC at enforcement makes it harder to pose as your company to owners and tenants.

Tenant and applicant data comes second. Screening reports, identity documents, income statements and lease files accumulate in email, in shared drives and in the property management system. We find where the data sits, remove the copies nobody needs, put multi-factor authentication on the people and systems that can reach it, set retention so old applicant files are deleted on a schedule, and check the logs so a question about who opened a file can be answered. State breach-notification laws set the clock if something goes wrong, so the plan names who decides and who calls counsel.

Building systems are the third gap. Access-control servers, door controllers, IP cameras and recorders, elevator and HVAC gateways, and the building management system often arrive installed by a vendor with default settings and a connection to whatever network was closest. We map every system and the vendor who supports it, move each class onto its own network (VLAN) per building with a firewall between them that permits only named traffic, change every default password, block these devices from reaching the internet directly, and alert when a new device appears or a camera starts talking to something it never talked to before. BACnet and similar building protocols were not designed with authentication, so isolation does the protecting.

Resident and guest Wi-Fi is the fourth. We separate it from everything else, turn on client isolation so one resident cannot see another's devices, and where the building offers it, give each unit its own key and network. Nothing on the resident side has a route to the office or to the building systems, and we test that from the resident side.

Vendors, owners and contractors come fifth. Instead of a shared remote-support password, each technician gets a named account with multi-factor authentication, access approved for a window and a single system, and a recorded session. Owner and vendor portals are reviewed for accounts that outlived the relationship, and file sharing uses expiring links.

Ransomware readiness protects rent collection. The property management system, the accounting ledger and the trust-account records are often on one server. We separate them, keep backups on a separate identity with an immutable copy, restore one to prove it works, and write a short plan for the week the system is down: how rent is received, how owners are paid and who calls the insurer.

Related work on our track record: a property manager that isolated building access-control and camera systems after a vendor remote-access incident (illustrative), a general contractor's segmented job-site network (illustrative), a title and escrow office's callback control against deepfake wire changes (illustrative), and a coworking operator's multi-building network design.

Insight

Building Systems Security for Property Managers: BACnet/IP, Access Control, Cameras and Vendor Remote Access

Elevators, air handlers, door readers and cameras are computers on a network, installed by trades and often maintained by vendors who log in from outside. This is how to keep them from becoming the way into your office systems.

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Frequently asked questions

Direct answers to the questions we hear most. Something else on your mind?

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How do criminals target rent and owner distributions?

They send a message that looks like part of a normal thread asking accounting to pay an owner or vendor to a new bank account, or they take over a resident or owner portal login and change the payout details. The defense is a written rule that no bank-detail change is made from a message alone: call back on a number already on file, use two approvers and hold the first payment to a changed account.

Why should door access and cameras be on a separate network?

They are computers, often installed by a vendor with default passwords and maintained remotely. If they share a network with the leasing office and residents, one weak vendor password can become a way into everything. Putting each class of system on its own network per building, with a firewall that allows only named traffic, limits the damage.

How long should we keep tenant and applicant files?

Keep them only as long as your lease, legal and accounting needs require, then delete them on a schedule. Screening reports, identity documents and income records are what make a breach serious, so fewer copies in fewer places is safer. Retention periods vary by state and document type, so check with counsel before setting them.

Can residents on our Wi-Fi reach each other's devices or our office?

They should not. Resident and guest Wi-Fi should be separate from everything else, with client isolation so one resident cannot see another's devices, and no route to the office or the building systems. We test this from the resident side to confirm.

How should outside vendors get remote access to our systems?

Each technician should have a named account with multi-factor authentication, access approved for a set window and a single system, and a recorded session. A shared remote-support password for many technicians is the thing to retire. We also review owner and vendor portals for accounts that outlived the relationship.

Do you know if your company is safe?

Speak with a security engineer today. The first assessment call is free and confidential.

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