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Nonprofit Illustrative engagement

Business-email-compromise wire fraud attempt stopped at a nonprofit, and DMARC moved to p=reject

A nonprofit of about 25 staff with a small finance team, a leader in its segment.

Scale
1 attempted wire of a grant-sized amount, 1 lookalike domain, 9 sending services found, 1 domain moved to p=reject
Engagement
3 days to stop the attempt and trace it, 8 weeks to move DMARC from monitoring to reject

The challenge

A finance coordinator received an email that appeared to come from the executive director, asking her to send an urgent wire to a new vendor. The sender address was a lookalike domain, but the real domain had no enforced DMARC policy, so staff could not tell a spoofed message from a real one. She called the director before paying, and the wire was not sent. The board wanted to know how close it had been and how to stop a repeat.

What our team delivered

  • Message trace and header review to confirm the lookalike domain, find which mailboxes received the same lure and rule out a compromised account
  • Takedown requests for the lookalike domain and a block on it in mail flow, plus a sweep of sign-in logs for any related access
  • DMARC reports analyzed for eight weeks: nine legitimate sending services (donation platform, newsletter, payroll and others) were found and set up with SPF and DKIM alignment
  • DMARC moved in steps from p=none to p=quarantine and then p=reject, with SPF kept under the ten-lookup limit and a monitored mailbox for the reports
  • A payment callback rule: any new vendor or change of bank details is confirmed by phone, using a number from the file, by a second person
  • A one-page staff guide and a short exercise for the finance team and board treasurer

Result

The attempted wire was stopped before any money moved, and spoofed mail from the nonprofit's domain is now rejected by receiving servers that honor DMARC. Failed alignment on legitimate mail dropped from 14 percent to under 1 percent before enforcement, so no donor receipts were lost. The callback rule is written into the finance policy the board approved. This is an illustrative engagement that describes the kind of work our team does; details are composite.

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After you purchase, we contact you within 1 hour, any time of day or night, to start onboarding.

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DMARC: from watching to rejecting

Share of mail claiming the domain that passes DMARC (SPF or DKIM aligned), week by week. In the monitoring phase (p=none) reports reveal forgotten senders; each one gets SPF and DKIM fixed. Quarantine sends failures to spam, reject refuses them at the receiving server. Illustrative figures.

DMARC: from watching to rejectingLine chart over 12 weeks. DMARC pass rate climbs from 61 percent in week 1 to 78 percent at the end of the p=none phase, 94 percent at the end of p=quarantine, and 99.1 percent in week 12 under p=reject.DMARC pass rate, 12 weeksp=nonemonitor onlyp=quarantinefailures to spamp=rejectfailures refused50%60%70%80%90%100%W1W2W3W4W5W6W7W8W9W10W11W1261%78%94%99.1%Week number on the x axis. Pass rate is measured on aggregate (rua) reports.

Mail that keeps flowing

Incoming mail is authenticated and scanned before it reaches anyone, mailboxes are copied across three regions so a server failure goes unnoticed, and outgoing mail leaves signed and encrypted.

Mail that keeps flowingDiagram of enterprise email flow. Inbound mail from an internet sender reaches the MX edge server running Postfix, where SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks light up in sequence, then passes a spam and malware filter; a spam message is diverted to quarantine. Clean mail is delivered to a mailbox cluster, a database availability group with copies in three regions. On a loop the active server in region A fails and the copy in region B activates automatically, so the next message is still delivered. Outbound mail from the user's mailbox is DKIM-signed and sent over an encrypted TLS connection to the recipient. INBOUNDOUTBOUNDSenderInternetMX edgePostfixSPFDKIMDMARCThreat filterSpam · malwareQuarantineMAILBOX CLUSTER · DAGRegion ARegion BRegion CActiveCopyActiveCopyMailboxUser inboxDKIM signingTLS encryptedRecipientSPFDKIMDMARCSPFDKIMDMARCOffline

Payment-change callback flow

A request to change bank details is never acted on from the request itself. Someone rings the number already on file, a second person approves, the outcome is written down, and only then is the payment released or held. If any step fails, the old details stay in use.

Payment-change callback flowFlow chart in five steps: a payment-change request arrives; someone calls back on the number already on file; a second approver confirms; the change is recorded with who, when and which number; the payment is paid or held. A failure at any step leads to holding the payment, keeping the old details and escalating to the named owner.From request to payment1Change requestArrives by email,call or portal.2CallbackRing the numberalready on file,never the one inthe request.32nd approverA different personconfirms thechange.4RecordedWho, when andwhich numberwas called.5Pay or holdPay on new detailsonly if everystep has passed.Any step fails, or nobody can be reached: hold the paymentKeep the old details in use and escalate to the named owner.Illustrative control. The callback number comes from existing records, never from the request.

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