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Healthcare services Illustrative engagement

A clinic group's HIPAA security risk analysis, external and internal penetration tests, and a tracked remediation plan

A healthcare group of 9 clinics with about 350 staff and its own electronic health record system.

Scale
~9 clinics, ~350 staff, ~40 systems that handle ePHI, 1 external and 1 internal test
Engagement
6 weeks of analysis and testing, with remediation tracked over the following 4 months

The challenge

The group had never completed a documented risk analysis of the systems that hold ePHI, and an insurer and a hospital partner had both asked for one. Clinic networks had grown by acquisition, and nobody could say what an attacker on the internet, or on a clinic's guest network, could reach.

A healthcare group of 9 clinics needed to show that it had assessed the risks to the electronic protected health information (ePHI) it handles, as the HIPAA Security Rule requires. The client is not named on this page, and this is an illustrative engagement that describes the kind of work our team does; details are composite. No patient data was needed or viewed: the work was about systems, settings and access, not records.

The risk analysis came first, because the rule requires one under 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A). Our team built an inventory of every system that creates, stores or sends ePHI, drew where the data moves between clinics, billing, labs and vendors, and recorded the threats and weaknesses for each system. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services publishes a Security Risk Assessment Tool for smaller practices, and its questions were used as one input, alongside NIST SP 800-66 guidance on the Security Rule. Each risk was rated by likelihood and impact so that the list could be ranked.

Testing then checked the ranked list against reality. An external penetration test, done under a signed authorization naming the addresses, accounts and hours, looked at what an attacker on the internet could reach: remote access, patient portal sign-in and exposed services. An internal test started as a stolen laptop on a clinic network would, and checked whether a user in a front office could reach the billing server, clinical devices or file shares, and whether passwords and local administrator rights could be reused across clinics.

Findings were written as a remediation plan with an owner, a priority and a due date for each item. The usual fixes were multi-factor authentication on remote access and email, network segmentation between clinical devices, front-office computers and guest Wi-Fi, patching of exposed services, removal of shared accounts, and backups that are tested by a restore. Items that could not be fixed at once stayed on a risk register with a decision recorded by the group's leadership, which is the evidence an auditor asks to see.

Retesting confirmed that the fixed items were closed, and the analysis was dated and filed. The group now repeats the analysis each year and after major changes, such as a new clinic or a new electronic health record system. This is a technical assessment, not a legal opinion or a certification of HIPAA compliance.

What our team delivered

  • A system inventory and data-flow map covering every system that creates, stores or transmits ePHI, including vendors and clinic-to-clinic links, with no patient records opened
  • A risk analysis in line with 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A), using the HHS Security Risk Assessment Tool's questions and NIST SP 800-66 as inputs, with each risk rated by likelihood and impact
  • An external penetration test under signed rules of engagement, covering remote access, the patient portal and exposed services
  • An internal penetration test from a clinic network position, checking segmentation between front office, clinical devices, billing and guest Wi-Fi, and password and local administrator reuse
  • A remediation plan with an owner, priority and due date per item, and a risk register for items accepted for now, with leadership's decision recorded
  • A retest of the closed items and a dated report that the group can show an insurer, a partner or a regulator

Result

The group has a documented, dated risk analysis, tested evidence behind it and a remediation plan it works through item by item. The same cycle now repeats each year and after major changes.

Get this for your company

Related services with fixed prices and a written scope.

Initial assessment of public endpoints

What an attacker can see and reach from the internet: your domains, mail, websites, remote access and cloud exposure.

Report within 5 business days of kickoff

$1,000 per assessment

Details

Managed IT and security (MSP)

One monthly price per team member: help desk, device management, patching, backup monitoring and security basics.

Onboarding starts within 10 business days

$100 per team member, per month

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Insurance-ready bundle

The three things cyber insurers and clients ask for most: an external assessment, a phishing simulation for 25 users and a disaster recovery plan.

Assessment report in 5 business days; plan draft in 15 business days

$5,400 per bundle, phishing simulation for 25 users

Details

Managed security monitoring

Endpoint detection and response watched by our analysts, priced per device.

Agents deployed within 7 business days

$18 per endpoint, per month

Details

After you purchase, we contact you within 1 hour, any time of day or night, to start onboarding.

No payment is taken online. When we call you within the hour we confirm the scope and send an invoice (ACH, card or crypto).

Attack it before attackers do

Our red team probes your systems the way a real attacker would, and every weakness it finds becomes a fix your defenders put in place and we retest.

Attack it before attackers doDiagram of offensive versus defensive security. On the left, the red team runs reconnaissance, an exploit attempt and a lateral movement attempt against your systems in the centre. On the right, the blue team detects the activity through a SIEM and EDR alert, contains the affected host and patches the weakness. The lateral movement attempt is blocked once the host is contained. A loop along the bottom shows findings becoming fixes and then being retested. Offensive (red team)Defensive (blue team)1ReconScan and map2Exploit attemptTest weak points3Lateral movementTry to spread1DetectSIEM · EDR alert2ContainIsolate the host3PatchClose the gapYour systemsTested and hardenedEvery finding becomes a fix, then a retestFindingsFixesBlocked

Separate by region and by business unit

Each business unit lives in its own VRF and VLAN in every region, so a problem in retail cannot reach finance. Traffic between units has to pass a firewall that denies by default and allows only what is written down.

Separate by region and by business unitA grid with three regions, Americas, EMEA and APAC, and three business units, Finance, Retail and R&D. Each cell is a separate VRF with its own VLAN and VNI. Each business unit has one overlay running across its three regional cells, shown as a row. On the right a firewall zone enforces a zero-trust policy that denies by default. A red packet from Retail trying to reach Finance is blocked at the firewall. A teal packet from R&D to the shared DNS and identity services is allowed. AMERICASEMEAAPACFinanceVRF fin · VLAN 110VNI 10110VRF fin · VLAN 110VNI 10110VRF fin · VLAN 110VNI 10110RetailVRF retail · VLAN 120VNI 10120VRF retail · VLAN 120VNI 10120VRF retail · VLAN 120VNI 10120R&DVRF rnd · VLAN 130VNI 10130VRF rnd · VLAN 130VNI 10130VRF rnd · VLAN 130VNI 10130Firewallzoneszero trustdeny bydefaultSharedDNS · IdPdenyallowVRF · L3 isolationVLAN to VNI · L2Default-deny policyEVPN-VXLAN fabricWireGuard + IPsec WANLogs to one SIEM

Critical patches in days, not months

Distribution of days from vendor patch release to deployment for critical-severity CVEs, before and after a managed patching service. The dashed line marks two weeks: under CISA BOD 22-01, US federal agencies must remediate Known Exploited Vulnerabilities within two weeks for CVEs assigned in 2021 or later (six months for older ones). Private organisations are not bound by it, but it is a sensible benchmark. Illustrative figures.

Critical patches in days, not monthsGrouped bars of the distribution of days to patch critical CVEs, percent of patches. Before: 0 to 3 days 4, 4 to 7 days 8, 8 to 14 days 14, 15 to 30 days 26, 31 to 60 days 24, 61 to 90 days 14, over 90 days 10. After managed patching: 22, 40, 28, 7, 2, 1, 0. A dashed line at 14 days marks the CISA KEV remediation window. 26 percent were patched within 14 days before, 90 percent after.Days to patch, critical CVEs (% of patches)Before: ad hoc patchingAfter: managed patching0%10%20%30%40%4%22%0–38%40%4–714%28%8–1426%7%15–3024%2%31–6014%1%61–9010%0%90+days from patch release to deployedCISA KEV window: 14 days26% → 90%patched within 14 daysBOD 22-01: 2 weeks (CVE from 2021), 6 months (older). Each series sums to 100%.

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